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THE OCTO MOM MEETSCONSTITUTIONAL LAW: TESTING THECONSTITUTIONALITY OF RESTRICTINGFERTILITY TREATMENTSTheresa Miller-Sporrer*
I. INTRODUCTIONOn 26 January 2009, Nadya Suleman gave birth to eight children.  The1public outpouring of support quickly turned into widespread condemnation asmore information about Ms. Suleman’s multiple pregnancies and financialsituation was released.  Once the public learned not only that Ms. Suleman2had six other children but also that all fourteen children had been conceivedusing in vitro fertilization, the public began to question both her judgment andthe judgment of her doctor.  The public apparently was willing to accept the3birth if it was the non-deliberate product of a hormone-based fertilitytreatment but was less willing to accept the birth if it was the result of adeliberate choice on the part of Ms. Suleman and her physician.Recent media attention on the Suleman Octuplets, “John and Kate Plus8,” and other similarly situated high order births (those in which a mothergives birth to triplets or more) has created the impression that high order birthsare increasingly common. In response, the mainstream media transformed afew high profile instances of high order births into an epidemic and has
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implied that the medical community is hotly debating the proper response tothe problem.  Responding to this perceived public debate and noting public4interest in reducing the prevalence of high order births, several statelegislatures, including California, Missouri and Georgia, are consideringstatutory limitations on the use of fertility treatments.5The state and federal governments could take a number of possiblestatutory routes. The government could mandate selective reductions whenmultiple pregnancies result, eliminate or restrict access to hormone-basedtreatments, codify the existing medical guidelines, or take a more dramaticroute: change existing insurance law to favor those treatments least likely toresult in multiple pregnancies. Each of these options implicates significantconstitutional concerns.In setting into statutory stone the choices available to a woman and herdoctor, the states may violate federal reproductive and substantive due processlaw. Reproduction has long been held a fundamental interest, interferencewith which will trigger the Equal Protection Clause’s strict scrutiny test.6Since the days of Skinner, reproduction has become a fundamental right underthe Equal Protection Clause  although, as will become apparent, this has7resulted in a test that turns on undue burdens rather than on strict scrutiny.Although reproduction in the context of fundamental rights traditionally dealswith preventing and terminating pregnancies, the logic oftermination/prevention is equally applicable to the start of a pregnancy. Bothstages of reproduction implicate the same underlying fundamental interest.Both require some medical intervention in order to achieve their ultimategoals. Government interference with either would therefore trigger the samelevel of scrutiny.In the modern context, that level of scrutiny is the undue burden test laidout in Planned Parenthood v. Casey.  Under Casey’s model,  restrictions are8 9
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10. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541.11. Id.12. Id. at 541 (“When the law lays an unequal hand on those who have committed intrinsically thesame quality of offense and sterilizes one and not the other, it has made as invidious a discrimination asif it had selected a particular race or nationality for oppressive treatment.”).
likely unconstitutional if they place a substantial and undue burden on awoman seeking pregnancy and that burden was not supported by a substantialand legitimate state interest. Mandated selective terminations would likely failunder this test, as would most restrictions on access to hormone-basedtherapies. In contrast, codification of existing medical guidelines and changesto existing insurance law would likely survive Casey.This paper addresses which paths the government may take withoutviolating the constitutional rights of potential parents. These possibilities areaddressed from the perspective of a married couple seeking to have a child.The important issues presented by single women/men and by homosexualcouples seeking to have children are, unfortunately, beyond the limited scopeof this note.The paper begins by giving an overview of relevant reproductive law. Itthen discusses various methods of Assisted Reproductive Technology (ARTs)and their side effects. The paper concludes by assessing both theconstitutionality of ARTs and four possible government responses aimed atcurbing their ill effects: (1) mandated selective terminations; (2) restricting oreliminating access to hormone-based ARTs; (3) codification of the medicalcommunities standards and guidelines; (4) changes in insurance laws.II. OVERVIEW OF RELEVANT REPRODUCTIVE LAWA. Development of Reproduction as a Fundamental InterestReproductive law developed under the auspices of the Equal ProtectionClause as well as under substantive due process. Beginning with 1942’sSkinner v. Oklahoma,  the Supreme Court began to consider the reproductive10rights of individuals. Skinner found the sterilization of certain criminals butnot others violated the Equal Protection Clause. Oklahoma justified thesterilization on the basis that “habitual criminals” (those who have beenconvicted of three felonies of moral turpitude) should not be allowed toprocreate.  The court found that this violated the Equal Protection Clause11because the statute sterilized some classes of criminals but not others wherethe crimes were otherwise punished similarly.12
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Skinner  ultimately led to the application of strict scrutiny to cases13implicating fundamental interests. Under either a fundamental interest or afundamental right-based approach, governmental interference withreproduction triggers a higher level of judicial scrutiny than doesgovernmental interference in other areas. Skinner  is perhaps more applicable14to government action that limits access to ARTs because it specifically dealtwith the government taking affirmative steps to prevent certain people fromhaving children. Outside of Skinner, modern reproductive law focuses on thegovernment preventing persons from preventing/terminating pregnancies.Given that Skinner may be the more appropriate analytical model, theproper level of scrutiny would then fall under the Equal Protection Clause’sstrict scrutiny. In order to survive strict scrutiny, any measure taken by thegovernment would have to be (1) supported by a compelling and legitimategovernment interest; (2) narrowly tailored; and (3) the least restrictive meansavailable.  Under this test, for reasons discussed infra, mandated selective15terminations and elimination or severe restrictions of access to ARTs wouldboth fail. Codification of medical community standards and changes inexisting insurance laws would both pass this high level of scrutiny.B. Development of Reproduction as a Fundamental Right1. Foundational CasesSince the days of Skinner, reproductive law has followed a different path.The vast majority of cases now deal with prevention/termination ofpregnancies under the auspices of substantive due process. The right toreproduction as a fundamental right is rooted in both substantive due processand in the Equal Protection Clause.  Under its modern incarnation, the right16to substantive due process rests in the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee thatno person shall be deprived of his or her rights without due process of law.17In Lochner, the Court found that the right to contract was protected underthe Fourteenth Amendment and that this right had been violated.  For the next18fifty-years, Lochner was used to invalidate scores of legislation. The Lochner
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19. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).20. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).21. Id.22. Id. at 534.23. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 74.24. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 481.25. Id.26. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 516–22 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting).27. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485.28. Id. at 484–85.29. Id.30. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).31. Id. at 454.
Era began to erode in Meyer v. Nebraska (1923)  and Pierce v. Society of19Sisters (1925).  In Meyer, the Supreme Court struck down a law banning20schools from teaching foreign languages to children while in Pierce the Courtinvalidated a law requiring all children to attend public schools.  In each case,21the Court protected the fundamental right of parents to rear their children(absent unprotected criminal activity).  These holdings were carefully22distinguished from Lochner on the basis of the right implicated. In Lochner,only the right to economic liberty was implicated whereas in Meyer andPierce a much more fundamental interest—the right to rear children—was atstake.23Griswold v. Connecticut extended the fundamental right to rear childrento the conception of those children.  The plurality opinion found that24irrespective of the route taken to get there, limiting access to birth controlimpermissibly intruded into the privacy of the marital bedroom.  The majority25found that although neither the Constitution nor the Bill of Rights expresslylists a right to privacy, the “specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights havepenumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give themlife and substance.”26Taken together, the First, Third, Fourth, and Ninth Amendmentsnecessitate a penumbral right to privacy.  Without the right to privacy, those27rights expressly enumerated in the Amendments would have no actualmeaning.  The Griswold majority found that the government’s interests in28regulating access to birth control were insufficient to warrant the intrusioninto the protected rights of privacy and reproduction, which enforcing theregulation would require.29The decision in Eisenstady v. Baird built on this foundation andunmoored Griswold from marriage.  No longer did the right of access to birth30control rest on the privacy of marital relations.  This unmooring was31
86 PITT. J. ENVTL. & PUB. HEALTH L. [Vol. 5:81
32. Id. at 453.33. Id. at 443.34. Roe, 410 U.S. at 113.35. Id. at 163.36. Id. at 152–53.37. Id. at 150.38. Id. at 163.39. Id.40. Id.41. Id. at 163–64.
necessary because “[i]f the right of privacy means anything, it is the right ofthe individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmentalintrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decisionwhether to bear or beget a child.”  Accordingly, the governmental interest32was insufficiently compelling to warrant restricting access to birth control.332. Roe v. WadeIn light of the preceding cases, Roe v. Wade  is not as shocking a34conclusion as it appeared when it was first announced in 1973. In Roe, theCourt held that a woman had the right to an abortion during the firsttrimester.  The decision rested in the idea of bodily autonomy and the right35of the individual to decide core values about family and reproduction. In orderto determine the impact of these notions on the question of abortion, the Courtextended and applied the Griswold concept of a right to privacy.36In Roe, the Court noted that although the state maintains an interest inboth potential life and maternal health, at some point the state’s interest inmaternal health becomes less compelling than its interest in the potential life.37Thus, during the First Trimester, a woman may choose to have an abortionbecause at that point an abortion is safer than pregnancy and the fetus is notviable.38However, during the Second Trimester, access to abortion may berestricted as long as the restrictions consider the health of the mother.  Once39the fetus achieves viability, the state’s interest in protecting the life of thefetus becomes compelling enough to warrant restrictions on abortion becausethere is more than a moral justification under the external harm principal.  At40that stage, a mother’s liberty interests lessen, but the compelling governmentinterest is insufficient to warrant protection of the fetus at the expense of themother’s life.41
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42. Id. at 153.43. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 837.44. 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2010).45. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 837.46. Id. at 844.47. Id. at 846.48. Id. at 878–79.49. Id. at 860–61.50. Id. at 878.
If, under Roe, the “right of privacy, whether it be founded in theFourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal liberty and restrictions uponstate action, as we feel it is, or, . . . in the Ninth Amendment’s reservation ofrights to the people, is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decisionwhether or not to terminate her pregnancy[,]”  then that broad right to privacy42should also encompass a woman’s decision as to what method of assistedreproduction to use when beginning her pregnancy.3. Subsequent Reproductive Rights Case LawIn the years since Roe, reproductive rights law has changed in a numberof ways. Beginning in 1992 with Planned Parenthood v. Casey  and43continuing through the ban on partial birth abortions,  access to abortions has44been curtailed. Irrespective of one’s position on the merits of this retreat fromunrestricted access to abortions, the fact remains that recent case law hasaltered the original stance adopted in Roe.In 1992, Planned Parenthood v. Casey substantially changed the Roeframework but it did not un-ground Roe from a right to privacy.  In Casey,45Planned Parenthood challenged Pennsylvania’s abortion law, claiming that thelaw unconstitutionally limited a woman’s right to an abortion by imposing a24-hour waiting period and spousal as well as parental consent.  The Court46agreed, but not as broadly as Planned Parenthood desired.  The Court struck47down the requirement of spousal notification but upheld the other portions ofthe law (namely a 24-hour waiting period, informed consent, and parentalconsent for minors).48The Casey Court began by observing that although the majority of peoplein the country do not favor overruling Roe, a majority does support greaterrestrictions.  Accordingly, the Court held that the right to an abortion actually49means the right to stop the state from imposing an undue burden on a woman’sdecision to have an abortion.  The state maintains a legitimate interest in50protecting fetal life from the onset and can justify restrictions on abortions
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51. Id. at 874.52. Id. at 878.53. Id. at 877.54. Carhart v. Gonzales, 550 U.S. 124 (2007).55. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 945–46 (2000).56. Id.57. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 124.58. Id. at 143–45.59. Id. at 161–65.60. Id.
that stop short of being an undue burden.  However, any restrictions must51provide for medical emergencies and protect the health of the mother.52Similarly, in the case of ARTs, the majority of Americans appear willingto have greater government control in the area. The public is troubled byhigh-order multiples and by the short- and long-term complications many ofthese children suffer. However, given the number of Americans who seek touse ARTs each year, the public would likely be unwilling to accept either aban or severe restrictions on access to selected ARTs.The Court thus substantially revised Roe v. Wade even as it ostensiblyaffirmed it. The Court replaced a strict scrutiny test with one based in ‘undueburdens.’ An undue burden, the Court wrote, was a “substantial obstacleplaced in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.”53The Court initially avoided an application of the Casey framework topartial birth abortion legislation.  In Stenberg v. Carhart, the Court did not54find it necessary to apply the Casey framework to the law because the lawfailed to adequately provide for an exception when the health of the motheris at risk.  The Court invalidated the law on that basis without addressing the55underlying issue of whether partial birth abortions should be available.56Seven years later, the Court could not avoid the confrontation. In applyingCasey, the Court in Carhart v. Gonzales significantly retreated from the largefraction analysis.  In an opinion replete with references to maternal love and57the regret women feel after an intact dilation and excavation (D&E) partialbirth abortion, the Court upheld the Federal Partial Birth Abortion Ban in spiteof the arguably insufficient exception for preservation of the mother’s health.58The Court felt that intact D&E is never medically necessary and that basicD&E is always as safe as intact.  This decision was reached without a59consensus within the medical community concerning whether intact D&E isever medically necessary. Further, the testimony in favor of the ban generallycame from non-experts.  By finding that intact D&E is never medically60necessary, the Court summarily eliminated those women for whom intact
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61. Telephone Interview with Melanie M. Ochalski, MD, Magee Women’s Hospital (Oct. 22, 2009).62. Am. Soc’y of Assisted Reprod. Guidelines, Fertility & Sterility, Vol. 90, Supp. 3, Nov. 2008.63. Telephone Interview with Melanie M. Ochalski, MD, supra note 61; Am. Soc’y for Reprod.Med., Patient Fact Sheet: Fertility Drugs & the Risk of Multiple Births, 2008; Am. Soc’y for Reprod Med.,Multiple Pregnancy & Birth: Twins, Triplets, & Higher Order Multiples, A Guide for Patients, (2004);Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., Patient’s Fact Sheet: Challenges of Parenting Multiples (2003).64. Id.65. Id.
D&E would be medically necessary or preferable from consideration. Thus,there was no large fraction affected by the law, making any assessment underCasey moot.The danger of Gonzales is not its affirmation of a ban on intact D&E.Rather, its danger lies in the justifications for that affirmation and itswillingness to assume a paternalistic approach to intimate medical decisions.In assuming that a woman will regret her decision and using this assumptionto validate its decision, the Court intrudes on her liberty and right to makedecisions about her own life, whether or not she will later have regrets abouther decision. The Court’s willingness to make and use such assumptions hasimplications outside of abortion law. In the context of governmental intrusioninto assisted reproduction, this willingness implies that the Court would bewilling to find that women would regret having high order multiples and thatthis regret would validate (at least partially) government imposed limits onaccess to fertility treatments.III. OVERVIEW OF AVAILABLE FERTILITY TREATMENTS ANDASSOCIATED RISKSFertility treatments have been available for nearly as long as abortion hasbeen legal. Like abortions, determining which fertility treatment to use is avery patient-specific decision.  Before beginning a course of treatment, the61American Society for Assisted Reproduction mandates that couples receivecounseling about both the medical treatments available and any possible sideeffects.  During this consultation, a physician discusses the possibility of62multiple births and the side effects inherent therein.  Pre-term delivery with63its associated risks of low birth weight and physical/mental developmentalimpairments, Cesarean sections, increased risk of pre-eclampsia andgestational diabetes are all discussed.  The physician may also go over the64financial and emotional burdens inherent in caring for multiple infants/youngchildren, including an increased divorce rates for couples with multiple birthchildren.65
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66. Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., Assisted Reproductive Technologies: A Guide for Patients (2008),http://www.asrm.org/uploadedFiles/ASRM_Content/Resources/Patient_Resources/Fact_Sheets_and_Info_Booklets/ART.pdf.67. Telephone Interview with Melanie M. Ochalski, MD, supra note 61.68. Id.69. Id.70. Fertility Plus, http://www.fertilityplus.org/faq/iui.html (last visited Dec. 19, 2009).71. Id. at 72.72. Id.73. Id.74. Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., Assisted Reproductive Technologies: A Guide for Patients, supranote 66.75. Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., Multiple Pregnancy and Birth: Twins, Triplets, & Higher Order
The goal of this discussion is for the woman or couple to make aninformed decision about the course of treatment.  However, “at the end of the66day these couples are so desperate to have a baby that they can’t even reallythink about the physical and emotional side effects. So how good is theirconsent?”  Ultimately, desire and bias aside, these women and couples have67been made fully aware of the risks they face. They accept the consequencesof their actions and choose, under the consultation of their doctors, a courseof treatment that works best for them as individuals.Fertility TreatmentsInteruterine InseminationAs the name implies, interuterine insemination involves the fertilizationof an egg or eggs within the uterus.  A woman undergoes one of several68hormone therapies to stimulate the maturation of egg follicles.  In the United69States, doctors typically halt hormone therapy when four egg follicles reachmaturity, although in Europe doctors typically halt at three.70At this point, either the woman and her partner engage in timedintercourse or the woman is injected with a cleaned sperm sample.  A71successful pregnancy occurs approximately 15% after a single cycle butincreases to 50% after three.  If the process creates more than one or two72viable embryos, which it does 23-30% of the time, the woman is given theoption of selective reduction.  Many women opt for the procedure and give73birth to either a singleton or twins.74Hormone therapy coupled with interuterine insemination is more likelyto result in high order multiples than is in vitro fertilization (discussed ingreater detail infra).  Doctors generally prefer to use in vitro fertilization75
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Multiples: A Guide for Patients, supra note 63.76. Telephone Interview with Melanie M. Ochalski, MD, supra note 61; Am. Soc’y for Reprod.Med., Assisted Reproductive Technologies: A Guide for Patients, supra note 66.77. Id. at 10.78. Id.79. Fertility Plus, supra note 70.80. Advanced Fertility Center of Chicago, http://www.advancedfertility.com/ivfprice.htm.81. Fertility Plus, supra note 70.82. Id.83. Telephone Interview with Melanie M. Ochalski, MD, supra note 61.84. Id.85. Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., Assisted Reproductive Technologies: A Guide for Patients, supranote 66.86. Id. at 10.87. Id. at 8–9.
because the process gives them greater control over the outcomes, butinteruterine insemination is often a better, or the only viable, option.  Some76couples may have religious objections to fertilization taking place outside ofthe mother while others may be faced with significant financial limitations.77Financial concerns are often a primary reason for opting for hormone therapycoupled with interuterine injection.  Each cycle costs between $200-30078without hormones and around $5,000-6,000 with hormone treatment.79Although this is high, the figure is far lower than the $9,000+ per cycle costof in vitro fertilization.80 In Vitro FertilizationInteruterine insemination works well for many women but not for all. Itis ineffective for women who suffer from tubal blockage or severe tubaldamage, ovarian failure (menopause), and advanced stages of endometriosis.81It is also ineffective if the male suffers from severe male factor infertility.  In82these cases, doctors have no option but must resort to in vitro fertilization.83In vitro fertilization is similar to inter-uterine insemination in that itbegins with giving the mother hormones to stimulate the maturation of eggfollicles.  The eggs are then harvested from the woman and combined with84a cleaned sperm sample.  From here, three different methods of in vitro85fertilization emerge: Gamete Intrafallopian Tube Transfer (GIFT), ZygoteIntrafallopian Transfer (ZIFT), and traditional.  After one to six days of86traditional in vitro fertilization, fertilized eggs are either implanted in thewoman or frozen.  The American Society for Reproductive Medicine87
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(ASRM) recommends implanting no more than three embryos at a time.  As88with interuterine insemination, if multiple embryos attach and become viable,the mother may choose selective termination.  Most women opt for the89selective termination procedure.  Unlike interuterine insemination, selective90termination is rarely necessary given that few doctors will implant more thanone or two embryos per cycle.91Gamete Intrafallopian Tube Transfer (GIFT) is a ‘hybrid’ of interuterineinsemination and traditional in vitro fertilization.  As with traditional in vitro92fertilization, a woman is given hormones to stimulate the production of eggs,and the mature eggs are removed from the woman.  The eggs are then93combined with mobile sperm, and the mixture is immediately injected into thewoman’s fallopian tubes.  As with interuterine insemination, this procedure94runs a higher risk of producing multiples.  GIFT is recommended for women95who did not succeed with interuterine insemination but who do not havesevere fertility problems.96If interuterine insemination and GIFT both fail to produce a successfulpregnancy, a doctor may recommend that a patient try a Zygote IntrafallopianTransfer (ZIFT).  ZIFT follows the same procedures as GIFT and traditional97in vitro up to the point of fertilization.  With ZIFT, the egg is fertilized98outside of the woman and then implanted. Unlike traditional in vitro, theembryo is implanted into the fallopian tubes.99The success rate for in vitro fertilization is much higher than interuterineinsemination. It results in live birth in 22% of cases after three cycles, and ashigh as 72% after six.  However, the increased success rate comes at a high100
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price. Each round of implantation costs an average of $12,000-plus.  Most101insurance plans will only cover a single cycle, and given that there is a lowerchance of initial success, this insurance shortcoming pushes many couplestoward interuterine insemination.102Side Effects of Multiple BirthsPremature delivery is one of the main side effects of high order multiplebirth. All of the other “side effects” are actually caused by preterm delivery.Twins carry a 60% chance of pre-term delivery.  With triplets, the likelihood103of a preterm delivery increases to over 90%.  Of the 137,085 twins born in1042006, 23,284 were conceived using in vitro fertilization.  The Bureau of105Vital Statistics found that “less than 20 percent of all triplets/+ born between1997-2003 are estimated to have been naturally conceived.”  Nationwide,10612.7% of births occur prematurely, and the use of fertility treatments hasincreased this figure by 36% over the past twenty-five years.107Preterm infants are also more likely to have a low birth weight comparedto full-term infants.  Low birth weight is defined as below 5.5 pounds.108 109These children “are at increased risk of health problems in the newborn periodas well as lasting disabilities, such as mental retardation, cerebral palsy, andvision and hearing loss.”110The high rate of premature birth and accompanying low birth weightsamong infants conceived using ART is a contributing factor to the UnitedStates’ high infant mortality rate, albeit a very minor one given the number ofbirths.  The United States ranks thirty-third in infant mortality, with nations111such as Cuba ranking above us.  Understandably, the federal government112
94 PITT. J. ENVTL. & PUB. HEALTH L. [Vol. 5:81
Population Prospectus the 2006 Revision: Highlights (2007), http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/wpp2006/WPP2006_Highlights_rev.pdf.113. Saul, supra note 4.114. Michèle Hansen et al., Twins Born Following Assisted Reproductive Technology: PerinatalOutcome & Admission to Hospital, 24 OXFORD J. HUM. REPROD. 2321–31 (2009).115. Id.116. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Press Release, National Birth Defects PreventionStudy Shows Assisted Reproductive Technology is Associated with an Increased Risk of Certain BirthDefects (Nov. 17, 2008), http://www.cdc.gov/media/pressrel/2008/r081117.htm.117. Centers for Disease Control, supra note 116.118. Id.
made reducing this rate a national priority. In addition to the humanitarianincentives for reducing the rate of premature delivery, there are very realeconomic incentives for reaching the same end because caring for prematureinfants born as a result of in vitro fertilization alone costs an estimated $1billion. These are “expenses that eventually get passed along through thesystem and on to businesses and the consumer.”113Caring for twins born as a result of fertility treatments could be moreexpensive, financially and emotionally, than caring for naturally occurringtwins.  A recent study published in the Journal of Human Reproduction, a114leading publication in Europe, found that twins born as a result of assistedreproductive therapy (ART) were significantly more likely to die within amonth of birth, spent on average four more days in the hospital and sufferedfrom longer term health problems more often than naturally occurring twins.115The same journal published the results of study in 2008 indicating thatsingletons born as a result of ARTs were “more likely to suffer from twice therisk of some types of heart defects, more than twice the risk of cleft lip withor without cleft palate and over four times the risk of certain gastrointestinaldefects compared with babies conceived without fertility treatments.”116However, the study noted that the absolute risk of any birth defect remainedvery low.  The study also observed that children born of ART induced117multiple pregnancies suffered no increased risk of birth defects.118Medical Community’s ResponseThe totality of these side effects is such that the issue is not whetheraction ought to be taken to limit the number of multiples (high order orotherwise) born each year but rather by whom the action should or may betaken. In response to these side effects, the medical community implementedits own regulations and procedures designed to reduce the occurrence of
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multiples.  These measures include counseling at the start of fertility119treatment, placing limits on the number of embryos transferred during IVF(currently, three at most), setting limits on when a woman may be givenhormonal therapy and on how many egg follicles should be permitted todevelop as a result.  Given the dramatic decrease in the incidents of high120order multiples in recent years, it appears these guidelines achieved theirdesired effect.121IV. ASSESSMENT OF LEGISLATIVE RESTRICTIONS ONFERTILITY TREATMENTSA. IntroductionIn order to capitalize upon the success of the medical community inlimiting high order births, the state and federal governments should expand thelimitations placed by the medical community on the number of viable embryosa mother may carry. To achieve this, state and federal governments shouldmandate selective reduction, eliminate the use of hormone-based fertilitytreatments, codify the medical community’s own standards, or take a moreradical approach: change existing insurance laws.Any measure must survive at the very least Casey’s undue burden test122because each solution touches on the right of a couple to beget children.Measures mandating selective termination and eliminating hormone-basedfertility treatments would likely fail that test while codification of existingmedical community standards and changes in insurance laws would likelypass. Alternatively, a measure may be subject to the higher strict scrutiny testunder a Skinner analysis.  The results of this analysis would be the same123with measures mandating selective termination and eliminating hormone-based fertility treatments failing the test and codification of existing medicalcommunity standards and changes in insurance laws passing it.
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B. Possible Legislative Actions1. Mandated AbortionsThe first ‘option’ can be dismissed out of hand. Constitutional and publicpolicy arguments aside, practically speaking no state or federal representativeendorsing such a law or regulation would be employed for long. Consideringboth Constitutional and public policy arguments, mandated selectivetermination violates a host of constitutional rights, privacy among them. Froma policy standpoint, the United States has never intruded into the private livesof its citizens so deeply, and, frankly, it never should.2. Elimination or Sever Restriction of Access of Hormone-BasedFertility TreatmentsAlthough others have argued that the elimination or near elimination ofhormone-based fertility treatments would be a viable and constitutionaloption,  recent changes to both the data regarding children born of hormone-124based ARTs  and the rates of multiple births (high order or otherwise)125 126undermine the justifications for such a dramatic measure. Even without thesedevelopments, restrictions on access to hormone-based fertility treatmentswould be largely unconstitutional under either Casey’s undue burden test127or under an Equal Protection Clause strict scrutiny analysis.128ARTs are very different than other forms of medical treatment becauseof their ultimate goals: infertility and the creation of a human being. TreatingARTs and their regulation as if they are no different than blood pressuremedication is a mischaracterization and diminution of the ultimate issuesinvolved. ARTs implicate reproductive rights, which the Supreme Court hasrecognized as a fundamental right,  let alone a fundamental interest.  As129 130such, any regulation of ARTs must survive Casey’s tweaking of strictscrutiny.131
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Substantive Due Process Based ClaimsAlthough the majority of Americans appear willing to have greatergovernment control in ARTs, as the Court in Casey observed was true ofrestricting access to abortions, the constitutionality of placing significantlimits on access is questionable. The public is troubled by high-order multiplesand by the short and long-term complications many of these children suffer.However, given the number of Americans who seek to use ARTs each year,the public would likely be unwilling to accept either a ban or severerestrictions on access to selected ARTs. Restricting or eliminating access to hormone-based ARTs fails Casey’sundue burden test  for a number of reasons. First, scaling back access places132an undue burden on a couple seeking to have a child because some women canconceive only through hormone-based ARTs.  If an approved medication133does not work but a non-approved one would, the woman will not be able tohave a child. These procedures are also a necessary first step in the in vitroprocesses.  Eliminating or severely restricting access to hormone-based134therapies would therefore eliminate or restrict access to ‘non-hormone’ basedARTs as well. These roadblocks amount to placing a substantial obstacle inthe path of a couple seeking to have a child.Beyond placing an undue biological burden on certain couples, restrictingor eliminating access to hormone-based ARTs would place an undue financialburden on many more couples. The in vitro process costs upwards of $12,000per cycle.  The average couple requires four cycles in order to achieve135pregnancy and few insurance companies are willing to cover the process. Forcouples who lack coverage, the hormone-based ARTs are a viable financialoption, and are often their only one.Any measure seeking to limit or eliminate access must sufficientlyaddress this issue in order to be valid under Casey,  even though136socio-economic class is not recognized as a protected class. The actual issuein this case is not the financial classification of the couple but rather whethera government action has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle
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in the path of a couple seeking to have a child. Pretending otherwise is a grossmischaracterization of the issue.Equal Protection Clause Based ClaimsThese measures would face similar challenges under the Equal ProtectionClause’s strict scrutiny test. If the Court follows Skinner  because of the137factual similarities between that case’s sterilization of certain convicts andrestricting/eliminating access to certain infertile couples, then the governmentaction must pass a higher standard than the undue burden test laid out inCasey  to be valid.138Government interest would have to be legitimate and compelling,narrowly tailored, and the least intrusive means available.  In the realm of139ARTs, the legitimacy of the government interest is questionable because thereis insufficient proof that governmental intervention is needed and because therelationship between that interest and the measures implemented in its namewould be so extreme as to be irrational. Eliminating or restricting access tohormone-based ARTs in order to reduce the number of children born whosuffer long-term health problems incurred as a result of a multiple pregnancywould be analogous to eliminating or restricting access to fast food in orderto reduce the number of Americans who suffer long-term health problemsincurred as a result of obesity.Children suffer serious health problems regardless of whether they areborn as a result of ARTs. If the government may constitutionally justifyeliminating a method of procreation on the basis of possible adverse healtheffects in some cases where ARTs are used, the government rides a slipperyslope toward justifying limiting the ability of couples that may have childrenwith long-term health problems from having children. The justifications foreach limitation would be the same—a government concern for the long-termhealth of children. The difference would be the method of producing thosechildren.The otherwise compelling nature of the government interest is alsoweakened by the successful reductions in multiple births (high order orotherwise) the medical community guidelines have accomplished. Given thatthe incidence of such births (and with them their side-effects) is on the
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decline,  the ostensibly compelling nature of the government’s interest is140weakened.The efficacy of those guidelines also calls into question whetherrestriction/elimination of access to hormone-based ARTs would be narrowlytailored and if such action would be the least restrictive means available.Given the success of the guidelines and that they operate without severelyrestricting/eliminating access to hormone-based ARTs, government actiondoing so would be both insufficiently narrow and not the least restrictivemeans available.3. Codification of Medical Community StandardsCodification of existing medical community standards would besufficiently narrow, and it would pass the rational basis and undue burdentests, but it could only go so far. These guidelines successfully reduced theincidents of multiple births since their inception.  Codification of these141standards would standardize such progress but would not necessarilycapitalize upon it.Codification of existing standards passes both the undue burden and strictscrutiny tests. If doctors are unwilling to go beyond the guidelines out of aconcern derived from professional reputation and medical risks, then a coupleseeking ARTs would not be presented with an undue burden on their quest bygovernmental regulations/statutes limiting their access to those ARTs ofwhich the medical community approves. The couple would be unable toaccess the therapies with or without the governmental actions. Thus, thegovernment places no additional and no undue burden upon them.Several states have already codified these provisions but the efficacy ofthese measures remains uncertain. Further complicating the situation,codification would need to be performed in such a way as to ensure that whenthe medical community standards evolved, the law could evolve with it.Absent such fluidity, the government runs the risk of creating legal obligationsto engage in medical practices that have been discredited.
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4. Changes in Existing Insurance LawsCodification of these standards would be a good first step but it wouldonly go so far. In order for the government to continue the success of theASRM guidelines, it must change the existing insurance laws. Physicians andpatients alike already prefer the use of in vitro fertilization to hormone-basedmethods, all other factors being equal.  The doctor has greater control over142the results of the process and thereby greater control over any possible risks.The patient has a more guaranteed result and is not exposed to the sort of sideeffects associated with hormone-based ARTs.Patients and doctors, however, must consider factors other than the bestcourse of treatment. They must also consider the patient’s ability to pay. Invitro fertilization is expensive at between $12,000 and $15,000 a cycle. Inthose states that do mandate its coverage, it is covered only as a last resort.143In contrast, hormone-based ARTs may cost as little as $200-$300 a cycle.Changing the incentives for choosing ARTs methods to favor the moreexpensive but generally less risky in vitro would lead many patients anddoctors to choose in vitro first.In order for any measure to have real efficacy, the statute or regulationmust have two prongs. First, the measure would have to mandate coverage offertility treatments. Without this change, couples lacking coverage and lackingsignificant amounts of disposable income would turn first to hormone-basedARTs. Second, the measure must mandate that in vitro and its progeny shouldbe covered as a first option and not as a last resort.The change in coverage does not necessarily entail that all forms of ARTscost the patient the same amount. The changes simply mean that the out ofpocket expenses decrease and in vitro would be given a first option status,which in turn would likely lead to a decrease in the use of hormone-basedARTs. If these two prongs were established, the likelihood of high-ordermultiples would decrease precipitously.
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V. CONCLUSIONOf the four possible government responses to the risks recreated bymultiple pregnancies produced as a result of ARTs examined in this paper,only two can withstand Casey’s undue burden test and/or strict scrutiny underan Equal Protection claim. Taken either separately or together, codification ofexisting medical community standards and changes in insurance laws thatfavor the use of in vitro fertilization over hormone-based ARTs manage towithstand constitutional challenges and would likely produced the desiredresults.
